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ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION AND
THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE: FIX IT BEFORE PEOPLE FIND
OUT ABOUT IT
Daniel J. Capra
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1 (2015)
ABSTRACT
The first website on the Internet was posted in 1991. While
there is not much factual content on the earliest websites, it did
not take long for factual assertions—easily retrievable today—to
flood the Internet. Now, over one hundred billion emails are
sent, and ten million static web pages are added to the Internet
every day. In 2006 alone, the world produced electronic
information that was equal to three million times the amount of
information stored in every book ever written.
The earliest innovations in electronic communication are
now over twenty years old—meaning that the factual assertions
made by way of these electronic media are potentially
admissible for their truth at a trial if (and simply because) they
were made more than twenty years ago. This is due to Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(16), the so-called “ancient documents”
exception to the hearsay rule. Under the ancient documents
exception, documents that would normally be excluded as
hearsay are admissible if the document is at least twenty years
old, and if the party offering the document can show that the
document is “genuine,” or authentic. As electronic
communications continue to age, all of the factual assertions in
terabytes of easily retrievable data will be potentially admissible
for their truth simply because they are old.
This Article argues that the ancient document exception
needs to be changed because its rationale, while never very
convincing in the first place, is simply invalid when applied to
prevalent and retrievable electronically stored information
(ESI). Part I of the Article discusses the rationales for the
ancient documents rule and that exception’s relationship with
the rules of authenticity on which it is based. Part II addresses
whether the rationales for the ancient document exception, such
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as they are, can be sensibly applied to ESI. Part III raises and
answers some arguments against abrogating or restricting the
ancient documents exception as applied to ESI or even more
broadly. Part IV considers drafting alternatives for changing
the ancient documents exception in light of its pending risk of
use as a loophole for admitting unreliable ESI as evidence.
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INTRODUCTION

The first website on the Internet was posted in 1991.1 While
there is not much factual content on the very early websites, it
did not take long for factual assertions—easily retrievable
today—to flood the Internet. To take one example: the first
easily retrievable web page of the National Enquirer tabloid
containing assertive content is dated January 20, 1998 and can
1

Daven Hiskey, The First Website Ever Made, TODAY I FOUND OUT, May 24,
2010, http://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2010/05/the-first-websiteever-made (last visited Nov. 4, 2014, 7:06 pm).
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be found on the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine.”2 On
that webpage, the Enquirer asserts that Roseanne Barr and
her baby were “nearly killed by [her] hubby” and that officers
had to draw guns to save her life. The Enquirer webpage from
January 30, 1998 asserts facts about the “Clinton Crisis”—
including an assertion impliedly attributed to Hillary Clinton
that she “shared Monica with Bill.”3 Similarly outrageous
assertions can easily be found in electronic text
communications, which began in 1992,4 and emails, which were
used as early as 1965.5
All of these innovations in electronic communication are
now over twenty years old—meaning that the factual
assertions made by way of these electronic media are
potentially admissible for their truth at a trial if (and simply
because) they were made more than twenty years ago. This is
due to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16), the so-called “ancient
documents” exception to the hearsay rule. Under the ancient
documents exception, a document that would normally be
excluded as hearsay is admissible if the document is at least
twenty years old and if the party offering the document can
show that the document is “genuine,” or authentic.6
It is probably fair to state that the threat of pervasive use of
the ancient documents exception as applied to electronic
information is not at crisis level right now because
electronically stored information (ESI) did not become
ubiquitous until somewhat less than twenty years ago. But it
will not be long before all of the factual assertions in terabytes
of easily retrievable data will be potentially admissible for their
truth simply because they are old.7 For example, the Wayback

2

3

4

5

6
7

National Enquirer, Jan. 20, 1998, WAYBACK MACHINE, http://web.archive
.org/web/19980120010422/http://nationalenquirer.com (last visited Nov. 4,
2014). Another example of a website that allows users to access archival
copies of webpages is www.cachedpages.org, which allows users to employ
one interface to search three different archival services—the Wayback
Machine, Google Cache, and Coral Cache.
Clinton Crisis: Breaking News, NATIONAL ENQUIRER, Jan. 30, 1998,
available at http://web.archive.org/web/19980130025606/http://www.nat
ionalenquirer.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
Kyle Russel, The First Text Message Ever Was Sent 21 Years Ago Today,
BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 3, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-firsttext-message-ever-2013-12.
Ian Peter, The History of Email, NET HISTORY, http://www.nethistory
.info/History%20of%20the%20Internet/email.html (last visited Nov. 4,
2014).
FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
For convenience, “old” in this article means more than 20 years old—i.e.,
old enough to trigger the ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule.
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Machine allows easy retrieval of over 398 billion web pages.8 In
1998, there were approximately 47 million email users in the
United States, sending a total of 182.5 billion emails per year.9
The amount of electronically stored information has been
doubling or tripling every eighteen to twenty-four months.10 In
2011, the digital universe contained 1800 exabytes of
information, enough data to fill 57.5 billion 32GB Apple
iPads.11 In 2006 alone, the world produced electronic
information that was equal to three million times the amount
of information stored in every book ever written.12 Over one
hundred billion emails are sent each day.13 Ten million static
web pages are added to the Internet every day.14 Most of this
information will never make it to a piece of paper.
Up until now, the ancient documents rule has been a sleepy
little exception applied to hardcopy information. In the almost
forty years of practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
ancient documents exception has been invoked in less than one
hundred reported cases. Conversations that I have had with
(not-to-be-named) judges indicate that many are unaware that
the exception even exists. It is fair to state that, at this point,
the ancient document exception is not on the radar for most

8
9

10

11

12

13

14

Don MacLeod, iWitness: Archival Research, 40 LITIG., no. 4, 2014, at 18.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST
PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 4 (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al. eds., July 2005
ed.).
Gil Press, A Very Short History of Big Data, FORBES, May 9, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/05/09/a-very-short-history-ofbig-data (noting that data was estimated to double every eighteen months
between 2006 and 2010 based on projected growth rates).
Rich Miller, ‘Digital Universe’ to Add 1.8 Zettabytes in 2011, DATA CENTER
KNOWLEDGE, June 28, 2011, http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/arch
ives/2011/06/28/digital-universe-to-add-1-8-zettabytes-in-2011; see JOHN
GANTZ & DAVID REINSEL, INT'L DATA CORP., STATE OF THE UNIVERSE: AN
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2011), http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-rep
orts/idc-extracting-value-from-chaos-ar.pdf (explaining the significance of
the expansion of the digital universe). The IDC website states the data in
terms of zettabytes. Id. One zettabyte is equal to one thousand exabytes.
Zettabyte, SEARCHSTORAGE, http://searchstorage.techtarget.com/definition
/zettabyte. This article uses exabytes for consistency (last visited Mar. 29,
2015).
JOHN F. GANTZ ET AL., INT'L DATA CORP., THE EXPANDING DIGITAL UNIVERSE
1 (2007), http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/expanding-digitalidc-white-paper.pdf.
THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2013-2017, at 3
(2013), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Email-Sta
tistics-Report-2013-2017-Executive-Summary.pdf.
Jason R. Baron & Ralph C. Losey, E-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE
(Feb. 11, 2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M.
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lawyers or judges. This is surely because the likelihood of
finding a hardcopy document that is twenty years old and also
relevant to an existing litigation is quite small.
But that can change now that much ESI has reached, if not
surpassed, the twenty-year mark. It has been said that ESI
“surrounds us like an ever-deepening fog or an overwhelming
flood.”15 The question is whether anything should be done
about the ancient documents exception before that exception—
and its applicability to ESI—are discovered by lawyers and
judges. The potential problem is that ESI might be stored
without much trouble for twenty years, and the sheer volume of
it could end up flooding the courts with unreliable hearsay,
through an exception that would be applied much more broadly
than the drafters (or the common law) saw coming in the days
of paper. Examples include self-serving emails from a business,
tweets and texts about events from people who were not at the
event, web postings accusing individuals of misconduct, and
anonymous blog posts. And while it is true that the twentyyear time period will serve as a limit to admissibility in some
cases, there are many plausible examples of old ESI that will
be relevant—in criminal cases, many serious crimes are no
longer limited by statutes of limitations; and in civil cases such
as antitrust and environmental cases, the long-term nature of
the wrong may well be shown (or not shown) by old ESI.16
This Article argues that the ancient document exception
needs to be changed because its rationale, while never very
convincing in the first place, is simply invalid when applied to
prevalent and retrievable ESI. Part I of the Article will discuss
the rationales for the ancient documents rule and that
exception’s relationship with the rules of authenticity on which
it is based. Part II will address whether the rationales for the
ancient document exception, such as they are, can be sensibly
applied to ESI. Part III will raise and answer some arguments

15

16

DAVID ROBERT MATTHEWS, ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION: THE
COMPLETE GUIDE TO MANAGEMENT, UNDERSTANDING, ACQUISITION,
STORAGE, SEARCH, AND RETRIEVAL 81 (2013). On the prevalence of ESI, see
Martin Hilbert & Priscila Lopez, The World’s Technological Capacity to
Store, Communicate, and Compute Information, 332 SCI. 60, 62 (2011)
(“The total amount of information grew from 2.6 optimally compressed
exabytes in 1986 to 15.8 in 1993, over 54.5 in 2000, and to 295 optimally
compressed exabytes in 2007. This is equivalent to less than one 730-MB
CD-ROM per person in 1986 (539 MB per person), roughly 4 CD-ROM per
person of 1993, 12 CD-ROM per person in the year 2000, and almost 61
CD-ROM per person in 2007. Piling up the imagined 404 billion CD-ROM
from 2007 would create a stack from the earth to the moon and a quarter
of this distance beyond (with 1.2 mm thickness per CD)).
See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
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against abrogating or restricting the ancient documents
exception as applied to ESI or even more broadly. Part IV will
consider drafting alternatives for changing the ancient
documents exception in light of its pending risk of use as a
loophole for admitting unreliable ESI as evidence.
I.

THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS RULE—AUTHENTICITY
RULE AND HEARSAY EXCEPTION

The ancient documents “rule” is actually comprised of two
rules. One is a rule on authenticity, which provides standards
for qualifying an old document as genuine. The other is a
hearsay exception for all statements contained in an authentic
ancient document. These rules are derived from the common
law, although the relevant time period has been reduced from
thirty years in the common law to twenty years in the current
rules.17
Rule 901(b)(8) provides as an example of evidence satisfying
the standards of authenticity a document or “data compilation”
that “(A) is in a condition that creates no suspicion about its
authenticity; (B) was in a place where, if authentic, it would
likely be; and (C) is at least twenty years old when offered.”18
The idea behind the rule is plain: if something has been found
in a likely place after more than twenty years, the chances of it
being a fake are sufficiently small that its genuineness becomes
a matter for the jury to consider. As the Advisory Committee
puts it, the rationale for Rule 901(b)(8) is “the unlikeliness of a
still viable fraud after the lapse of time.”19 The standard for
establishing authenticity to the court is low—a showing
sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that the document
is what the proponent says it is.20 Under that low standard, if a
17

18
19
20

See FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note (citing common law
basis for the hearsay exception that stems from the rule on authenticity);
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note (adopting the “familiar
ancient document rule of the common law”). The Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 901(b)(8) attempts to explain the shortening of the time
period from thirty to twenty years as a “shift of emphasis from the
probable unavailability of witnesses to the unlikeliness of a still viable
fraud after the lapse of time” and concedes that any time period “is bound
to be arbitrary.” Id.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note.
See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1404 (3d Cir. 1994) (“the
burden of proof for authentication is slight”); United States v. Holmquist,
36 F.3d 154, 168 (1st Cir. 1994) (“the standard for authentication, and
hence for admissibility, is one of reasonable likelihood”); United States v.
Coohey, 11 F.3d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1993) (“the proponent need only
demonstrate a rational basis for its claim that the evidence is what the
proponent asserts it to be”).
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document looks old and not suspicious, and is found where it
ought to be, it makes sense to leave the question of authenticity
to the jury.21
But as the Advisory Committee noted, finding a document
to be authentic is different from finding the assertions in that
document to be reliable. Authenticity is a question of whether
the item offered is what the proponent says it is—for example,
that an email purportedly written by a person was actually
written by that person. Reliability is a question of whether the
assertions in a genuine item are in fact true—and that is the
concern of the hearsay rule.22 As the Committee put it, “since
most of these items are significant inferentially only insofar as
they are assertive, their admission in evidence must be as a
hearsay exception.”23 To address the hearsay issue, the drafters
included a hearsay exception, Rule 803(16), which provides
that “[a] statement in a document that is at least 20 years old
and whose authenticity has been established” is admissible
despite the fact that it is hearsay.24
Professors Christopher Mueller and Laird Kirkpatrick set
forth the most complete articulation of the rationale for the
ancient documents hearsay exception:
Need is the main justification. The lapse
of 20 years since the acts, events or conditions
described almost guarantees a shortage of
evidence. Witnesses will have died or
disappeared. Written statements that might fit
other exceptions (business records, past

21

22

23
24

Rule 901(b)(8) is not, however, the only avenue for authenticating an
ancient document and thus triggering the ancient documents exception to
the hearsay rule. Rule 803(16) says that the statements in a document
that is at least twenty years old and whose “authenticity is established”
are admissible for their truth. “Authenticity is established” means
established in any way. FED. R. EVID. 803(16). Thus, as will be discussed
below, the tried and true methods for authenticating ESI in general are
fully applicable to authenticating twenty-year-old ESI.
See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, 4
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 801.13 (10th ed. 2012) (“The
hearsay rule is designed to exclude a certain type of unreliable evidence.
Hearsay is presumptively unreliable because when an out-of-court
statement is offered for its truth, it is only probative if the person who
made the statement—the declarant—was telling the truth. But the
truthfulness of an out-of-court declarant cannot be assessed by the
ordinary methods with which we determine the truth of testimonial
evidence—oath, cross-examination, and the factfinder’s scrutiny of the
witness’s demeanor.”).
FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note.
FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
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recollection) are typically thrown out or lost or
destroyed25 . . . .
Naturally,
statements
in
ancient
documents are affected by risks of misperception,
faulty memory, ambiguity, and lack of candor
(they are not intrinsically more reliable than oral
statements), and a written statement unreliable
when made is unreliable forever. Ancient
documents do, however, bring fewer risks of
misreporting (because the document is in
writing),26 and they bring at least some
assurance against negative influences: When
authenticated, an ancient document leaves little
doubt that the statement was made; there is
little risk of errors in transmission; because of its
age, the document is not likely to have suffered
from the forces generating the suit, so there is
less reason to fear distortion or lack of candor.27
If a document satisfies the authenticity requirements of
Rule 901(b)(8) or satisfies any other ground of authentication
provided in Rules 901 or 902, and is over twenty years old,28
then every statement in that document can be admitted for its
truth. That is so because Rule 803(16) simply equates
authenticity of the document with admissibility of the hearsay
statements in that document. The rule does not purport

25

26

27

28

Whether the assertion of Professors Mueller and Kirkpatrick is applicable
when the old material is ESI will be discussed in Part III, infra.
Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s reliance on a writing as a guarantee of
reliability is in fact misplaced. The problem that the hearsay rule
addresses is that there is an out-of-court declarant who may be unreliable
and cannot be cross-examined. The reporting of the statement is not a
hearsay problem because the person reporting is on the stand subject to
cross-examination. Therefore it does not matter, for purposes of the
hearsay rule, whether the statement is oral or written. That is to say,
whether the statement was made is not a hearsay problem; the hearsay
problem is about whether the statement is true.
CHRISTOPHER MUELLER & LAIRD KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
8:100 (4th ed. 2013); see also FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s
note (arguing that “age affords assurance that the writing antedates the
present controversy”).
As noted above, the ancient documents hearsay exception does not require
the document to be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(8); it can be
authenticated in any way. So, for example, a twenty-year-old domestic
public document under seal is self-authenticating under Rule 902(1).
Thus, the statements in the document would escape the hearsay bar
without the need of the proponent to show authenticity under Rule
901(b)(8).
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specifically to regulate the reliability of the contents of an
ancient document through some circumstantial guarantee,
even though other hearsay exceptions in Rule 803 are grounded
in circumstantial guarantees of reliability.29 While the
Advisory Committee obliquely states, “age affords assurance
that the writing antedates the present controversy,” there is no
admissibility requirement in the rule that, in fact, the
statements must predate the controversy.30 As the court put it
in Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., “Once a
document qualifies as an ancient document, it is automatically
excepted from the hearsay rule under Fed. R. Evid. 803(16).”31
Consequently, the Threadgill court reversed a trial court’s
ruling that excluded an ancient document because the content
was untrustworthy.32
Rule 803(16) is the only rule of evidence that equates
authenticity with admissibility of hearsay.33 It is a curious
assumption that, just because an old document is authentic,
29

30
31
32

33

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (outlining a hearsay exception for
statements made for purposes of medical treatment based on
circumstantial guarantees of reliability inherent in obtaining medical
treatment, and on the fact that the statement must be pertinent to the
doctor’s treatment or diagnosis); FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (outlining a hearsay
exception for statements made in the course of regularly conducted
activity based on circumstantial guarantees of reliability inherent in
regular recording of regularly conducted activity).
FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note.
928 F.2d 1366, 1375 (3d Cir. 1991).
A qualification to the rule of broad admissibility in text does arise if the
ancient document itself refers to a hearsay statement—e.g., an old diary
entry stating that “The defendant just sent me a letter in which he
confessed to robbing my store.” The hearsay exception would cover the fact
that the diarist received a letter, but whether the defendant actually
confessed to the robbery would have to be handled by another exception—
in this case that would be a party-opponent statement, FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2). In other words, the ancient documents exception does not
abrogate the rule on multiple hearsay imposed by Rule 805—at least in
the view of right-thinking courts. See, e.g., United States v. Hajda, 135
F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the ancient documents exception
“applies only to the document itself,” and that “[i]f the document contains
more than one level of hearsay, an appropriate exception must be found
for each level”). For more on the ancient documents exception and
multiple hearsay, see Gregg Kettles, Ancient Documents and the Rule
Against Multiple Hearsay, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 719 (1999) (arguing
that the ancient documents exception is subject to the rule on multiple
hearsay, but noting the split of authority).
See Fagiola v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 906 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Because
of the hearsay rule, authentication as a genuine ERCO document would
not generally suffice to admit the contents of that document for its truth.
One exception is when documents are authenticated as ancient documents
under Rule 901(b)(8), in which case they automatically fall within the
ancient document exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(16).”).
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the statements in it are automatically reliable enough to escape
the rule excluding hearsay. Despite the Advisory Committee’s
assertion that the “danger of mistake is minimized by
authentication requirements,”34 none of the guarantees for
authenticity set forth in Rule 901(b)(8) or any other
authenticity rule do anything to assure that the statements in
the authentic document are reliable. As the Seventh Circuit
aptly put it in United States v. Kairys, the authentication rule’s
requirement that a proffered document be free of suspicion
“goes not to the content of the document, but rather to whether
the document is what it purports to be.”35 For example, a
twenty-year-old National Enquirer, kept in an archivist’s
study, will be found authentic—but should that mean that
every single statement in the Enquirer about Michael Jackson,
or alien invasions, should be admissible for its truth?
Indeed, that would follow from the Advisory Committee’s
assertion that any authentic document should be admissible for
the truth of its assertions. Yet the Advisory Committee gives no
indication of why the danger of unreliable assertions is
minimized by authentication requirements for ancient
documents but not for any other documents or statements. The
Advisory Committee’s assertion is especially weak given the
fact that a statement in an ancient document is admissible for
its truth even if the document is authenticated in some way
other than under Rule 901(b)(8)—Rule 803(16) simply states
that a statement is admissible whenever authenticity “is
established.”36 It follows that there is apparently nothing about
the authenticity requirements of Rule 901(b)(8) in particular
that warrant an assumption of the reliability of statements in
an ancient document; so why not throw out the hearsay rule
whenever any document is authenticated? The answer is plain:
the policy of the hearsay rule is to exclude unreliable out-ofcourt assertions,37 and that policy is not sufficiently
furthered—indeed it is ignored—if the only standard for
admissibility is that the document itself is genuine.
A further anomaly of the ancient documents hearsay
exception is inherent in its bright-line nature. For example, a
copy of the National Enquirer that is 19 years and 364 days old
could be authenticated,38 but none of the assertions in that
34
35
36
37

38

FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note.
782 F.2d 1374, 1379 (7th Cir. 1986).
FED. R. EVID. 803(16).
See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957,
958 (1974) (noting that hearsay is subject to “testimonial infirmities” that
can render it unreliable).
See FED. R. EVID. 902(6) (material purporting to be a newspaper or
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Enquirer would be automatically admissible for their truth.
The equation of authenticity and hearsay admissibility occurs
the second that the periodical becomes twenty-years-old.
Perhaps it is true, as the Advisory Committee concedes, that
“[a]ny time period selected is bound to be arbitrary.”39 But that
assertion only begs a number of questions. First, why is an
arbitrary time period the correct solution to either authenticity
or reliability? Given that the basis for an ancient documents
rule lies somewhere among the principles of necessity and lack
of motive to fabricate a document for litigation so far down the
road, why not articulate those policies as a textual standard of
admissibility? An arbitrary time period is an inexact surrogate
for the policies that appear to underline the ancient document
rules.
Second, even if a statutory time period is used, why use it
in such a binary fashion? Why not, for example, apply more or
less stringent standards of admissibility whenever a document
falls on one side or the other of the line? For example, Federal
Rule of Evidence 609(b) contains a ten-year time period
applicable to impeaching a witness with a prior conviction.40
But while the time period is arbitrary, the Rule does not
arbitrarily state that a conviction is admissible if falling on one
side of the timeline and inadmissible if it falls on the other. In
contrast to Rule 803(16), Rule 609(b) provides for a less
generous rule of admissibility if the conviction falls on the “old”
side of the line. An analogous solution for Rule 803(16) that
would avoid the irrationality of a statement inadmissible on
one day but admissible for its truth on another would be to
provide a different, somewhat more generous, rule of
admissibility for the “old” statement. But Rule 803(16) makes
no such effort.
In the end, Rule 803(16) is a radical and irrational hearsay
exception—an error of the common law that was adopted and
indeed exacerbated by the original Advisory Committee’s
reduction of the time period necessary to trigger it. The original
Advisory Committee did not provide a convincing explanation
for equating authenticity of a document and the reliability of
its contents—no explanation can be found in the legislative

39
40

periodical is self-authenticating).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note.
Rule 609(b) provides that “if more than 10 years have passed since the
witness’s conviction or release from confinement” evidence of the
conviction may be admitted to impeach the witness only if “its probative
value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect” and proper notice is provided. FED. R.
EVID. 609(b).
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history other than the Advisory Committee Note’s assertion
that statements predating litigation are more likely to be
reliable.
But if the rule is so misguided, why has the modern
Advisory Committee not done something about it?
The answer, I believe, is that Rule 803(16) has flown under
the radar because it is so rarely invoked.41 A Westlaw search
indicates that ancient documents have been admitted in fewer
than one hundred reported cases since the Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted.42 Of course, it is not possible to
determine how often the exception has been used in unreported
cases, but it is fair to state that judges do not invoke the
exception very often.
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules has always
taken a conservative approach to proposing amendments to the
Evidence Rules. Amendments are costly because experienced
litigators and judges need to know the rules that exist, often
without having the luxury of referring to a book. Any change to
those rules imposes dislocation costs on litigators, judges, and
the legal system as a whole—so the change had better be worth
it. For example, in 2003, the Justice Department sought to
amend Rule 410 to provide that statements made by a
prosecutor during plea negotiations could not be admissible
against the government if the defendant ended up going to
trial;43 as written, the Rule protects statements made by the
defendant in plea negotiations, but not those made by the
government.44 The rationale for the proposed change was that
Rule 410 is intended to encourage uninhibited plea
negotiations, and that this goal would be maximized by
protecting the statements of both sides. While the Department
of Justice seemed to propose a worthy and sensible change, the
Advisory Committee refused to pursue it, as indicated in the
minutes of the Spring 2004 meeting:
[A] number of questions and concerns were
raised about the merits of the draft amendment
41

42

43

44

The fact that the ancient documents exception was a backwater exception
might well explain the original Advisory Committee’s relative lack of
concern about it. But the problem addressed by this Article is that the
prevalence of ESI has destroyed the original “backwater” premise.
In contrast, for example, state of mind statements have been admitted
under Rule 803(3) in around 900 published cases. Searches for “803(16)”
and “803(3)” conducted on Oct. 1, 2014.
Minutes of the Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 10-13, Nov.
13, 2003, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minut
es/1103EVMin.pdf.
See FED. R. EVID. 410.
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to Rule 410. The most important objection was
that the amendment did not appear necessary,
because [every reported case has] held that a
statement or offer made by a prosecutor in a plea
negotiation [is inadmissible] against the
government as an admission of the weakness of
the government’s case . . . . [n]otwithstanding the
questionable reasoning [sometimes used to reach
this result] . . . .
....
Given . . . the fact that the courts are
reaching fair and uniform results under the
current rules . . . members of the Committee
questioned whether the benefits of an
amendment to Rule 410 would outweigh the
costs. The Committee ultimately concluded that
Rule 410 was not “broken,” and therefore that
the costs of a “fix” are not justified.45
If the goal is to propose amendments only when necessary
to remedy a real problem, it is understandable that the
Advisory Committee has not yet chosen to amend a rule that
many litigators and judges have never used or even thought
about. But now that terabytes and zettabytes46 of information
are reaching or have already reached a twentieth birthday, the
committee should rethink the ancient documents exception. In
other words, data overload is already, or soon will be, a real
problem worth fixing.
This new concern about the possible overuse of the ancient
documents hearsay exception has not gone unnoticed by the
Advisory Committee. The Committee is currently considering
whether the use of ESI warrants amending Rule 803(16) to
avoid abuse of that exception.47

45

46

47

Minutes of the Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 11-12, Apr.
29-30, 2004, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Min
utes/EV04-2004.pdf.
See Sridhar Pappu, To Handle the Big Data Deluge, HP Plots a Giant
Leap Forward, HP MATTER, June 2014, https://ssl.www8.hp.com/hpmatter
/issue-no-1-june-2014/handle-big-data-deluge-hp-plots-giant-leap-forward
(explaining how much data exists in the world).
See Agenda for Committee Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES
5, Apr. 4, 2014, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules
/AgendaBooks/Evidence/EV2014-04.pdf (displaying “Possible Amendment
to Rule 803(16)” as an agenda item).
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DOES THE RATIONALE FOR THE ANCIENT DOCUMENTS
EXCEPTION APPLY TO ESI?

It can certainly be argued that if the rationale of the
ancient documents exception is enough to support admissibility
of hardcopy, then it is enough to support the admissibility of
ESI. That argument begins with the observation that the
original Advisory Committee was aware of the existence of
electronic information and sought in some way to accommodate
it within the ancient documents rule. Rule 901(b)(8)—which as
stated above is an authenticity-based rule that provides a
gateway for admissibility under the hearsay exception—
specifically covers an old “data compilation” that is in
suspicion-free condition and found in a suspicion-free place.
However right or wrong the Advisory Committee was about
ancient documents’ admissibility, the Committee decided to
treat electronic information the same as hardcopy for purposes
of authenticity.48 The fact that the Advisory Committee foresaw
and accommodated ESI in the authenticity rule arguably
counsels caution in trying to rethink the ancient document
rule.
But even though consideration of a question by the original
Advisory Committee is surely relevant to the merits of an
amendment, it is not as clear that the original Advisory
Committee thought much about the risk to the hearsay rule
that might be found in the explosion of ESI. It is notable that
Rule 901(b)(8) specifically mentions data compilations and Rule
803(16) does not. Given the vast rate of data growth, it is likely
that the Advisory Committee was not explicitly thinking of the
possibility that terabytes upon terabytes of information would
become admissible for their truth simply because that
information was stored in a server for twenty years.49 Indeed,

48

49

See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note (“The familiar
ancient document rule of the common law is extended to include data
stored electronically or by other similar means . . . . This expansion is
necessary in view of the widespread use of methods of storing data in
forms other than conventional written records.”).
It should be noted that any argument based on the omission of a reference
to ESI in Rule 803(16) is weakened by the fact that after the restyling of
the Evidence Rules in 2011, Rule 803(16) can now in fact be plausibly read
to cover ESI. This is because the new Rule 101(b)(6) provides that “a
reference to any kind of written material . . . includes electronically stored
information.” Thus the reference to a “document” in Rule 803(16) would
appear to have been, so to speak, “electrified” by the restyling. The
counter to that argument is that, as emphasized in the Committee Notes
to the restyling, no change in the substance of any rule was made or
intended. See FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note to 2011
Amendments; FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 2011
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the proliferation of ESI shows that taking a hands-off approach
to a rule of evidence simply because the Advisory Committee
thought the rule was a good idea several decades ago ignores
relevant changes that take place over time.50
The question, then, is whether the explosion of electronic
information has separated ESI from the original justifications
for the hearsay exception for ancient documents. As stated
above, the primary justification for the ancient documents
exception is necessity, which comes down to the premise that it
is likely that all reliable evidence (such as business records)
has been destroyed within the twenty-year time period, and
thus we have to make do with more dubious evidence. This
necessity assumption is substantially undermined by the
growth of ESI. Because ESI is prevalent51 and easily preserved,
whatever reliable evidence existed at the time of a twenty-yearold event probably still exists. Indeed, the probability that most
or all ESI records (emails, text messages, receipts, scanned
documents, etc.) will be available is certainly higher than the
probability that hardcopy documents or eyewitnesses will still
be available and useful several decades after a contested
event.52 There is no reason to admit unreliable ESI on necessity
grounds if it is quite likely that there will be reliable ESI that
is admissible under other hearsay exceptions.53 Thus the

50

51

52

53

Amendments.
The Supreme Court often finds the Advisory Committee’s opinions
persuasive. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996) (establishing a
psychotherapist-patient privilege under Federal common law, a decision
“reinforced” by the fact that such a privilege was included in the list of
privileges that the original Advisory Committee sent to Congress). But
that does not mean those opinions are always controlling. See, e.g., Green
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989) (noting that original
Rule 609(a)(1), as written, led to an anomalous result in civil cases and
therefore “can’t mean what it says.”). And it especially does not mean that
the Advisory Committee has always been able to predict the changes in
society and technology that might justify a change to the Evidence Rules.
See Ronald J. Hedges, Daniel Riesel, Donald W. Stever & Kenneth J.
Withers, Taking Shape: E-Discovery Practices Under the Federal Rules,
SN085 ALI-ABA 289, 292 (2008) (“According to a University of California
study, 93 percent of all information generated during 1999 was generated
in digital form, on computers. Only 7 percent of information originated in
other media, such as paper.”); see also David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery
Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (showing that, of an estimated
5.6 million terabytes of data stored in 2002, 5.18 million terabytes were
stored electronically and an additional 420,000 were stored on film).
Challenges to the premise that old ESI is actually preserved/accessible
will be discussed in the next Part.
See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. International Media Films Inc., No.
CV 11-09112 SJO (AJWx), 2013 WL 3215189 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2013)
(finding that records regarding a film, more than twenty years old, were
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“necessity” of proving claims based on older information of
whatever provenance has been and will be answered by the
existence of bytes upon bytes of reliable electronic
information—information that was not or could not have been
preserved further in the past. If the ancient documents
exception remains as is, the legal system will face a situation in
which parties can freely admit unreliable ESI just because it is
old notwithstanding the existence of prevalent, reliable
alternative evidence.
But there is another (lesser) justification for the exception
that needs to be addressed—that an old statement has some
indicium of reliability due to the fact that it was made before
any litigation motive could have arisen. That justification is not
completely without merit, and it would seem to apply to ESI as
much as it applies to hardcopy. But there are a number of
counterarguments.
First, the fact that a statement was made before a specific
conflict arose does not mean it did not have some litigation
motive. For example, take a case in which a plaintiff is suing a
major corporation for employment discrimination. The
defendant wants to admit twenty-year-old text messages from
the plaintiff’s previous employer, casting aspersions on the
plaintiff’s work. It is certainly possible that such messages, if
true, could be probative to prove the employer’s lack of intent
to discriminate, or for some other non-propensity purpose.54
But as to hearsay—whether the activity even occurred—the
statements may well have been made under the previous
employer’s own litigation motive at the time.
Another common example of old evidence made under a
non-specific litigation motive is that of documents produced in
an environmental cleanup action under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of

54

admissible as business records). At the very least, the threat of rampant
use of old and unreliable ESI should lead to an adjustment of the Rule to
include something like the necessity language of Fed. R. Evid. 807—
requiring that the proffered evidence is more probative than any other
evidence reasonably available. One of the drafting alternatives infra
considers this possibility.
See, e.g., Alaniz v. Zamora-Quezada, 591 F.3d 761 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding
admissible evidence of the employer’s activity toward other employees to
establish modus operandi); Buckley v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 306 (4th Cir.
2008) (holding that evidence of plaintiff’s long-running participation in a
race discrimination class action should have been admitted as probative of
employer’s retaliatory intent); Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 131 F.3d 647 (6th
Cir. 1999) (finding admissible evidence of racial graffiti at employer’s
plant and racially offensive conduct toward African-American workers to
prove discriminatory intent even if not directed toward the plaintiff).
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1980 (CERCLA), which imposes liability for cleanup costs on
any company that deposits hazardous materials at a place
covered by the statute.55 The statute of limitations for a cost
recovery action under CERCLA runs from the day the plaintiff
performed certain acts to clean up the contamination, which
could be decades after the materials were deposited.56 It is
more than plausible to believe that a party would generate selfserving documents in anticipation of the possibility of some
CERCLA action far in the future. Another obvious example is
mass tort litigation stemming from hazardous substances. The
time differential here arises from a combination of latency
periods for the risks and the lengthiness of the proceedings.
But, as is seen in tobacco litigation, the litigation motive can
exist at the time a document is prepared even if the litigation
potential is far in the future.57
Given the sheer volume of old ESI, it is apparent that some
old ESI will have been made with a litigation motive of some
kind—and yet this ESI would be automatically admissible
under an unamended Rule 803(16) simply because it is old. It is
important to note that the existing Rule does not require that
the document actually have been prepared before a controversy
arose. The Advisory Committee assumed there would be no
litigation motive affecting old documents, but did not require a
finding of lack of motive in the text of the rule.58 Given docket

55

56

57

58

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (West 2014).
CERCLA § 113(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (establishing statutory period
running from “initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial
action”). Indeed, a good percentage of reported cases applying the ancient
documents exception to hardcopy are CERCLA actions. See, e.g., United
States v. Atlas Lederer Co., 282 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (finding
hardcopy customer documentation regarding a battery disposal site
inadmissible as business records but admissible as ancient documents);
Reichhold Chem. Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Fla. 1995)
(offering ancient documents in opposition to an affirmative defense to
CERCLA liability).
See, e.g., Rule 803(16): Ancient Documents, 15 FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE NEWS 90-177, 90-189 (1990) (“The phenomenon of docket delays
as well as the frequent litigation of liability arising from health
detriments that may take decades to come about may be giving new life to
the neglected ‘ancient documents' hearsay exception.”).
See, e.g., Langbord v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Civil Action No. 06-5315,
2011 WL 2623315, at *3 (E.D.Pa. July 5, 2011) (“Requiring courts to
ignore the ancient document rule's three requirements and make
determinations based on whether a document was prepared with similar
litigation in mind would require courts to assess a document's
trustworthiness or bias, a task inappropriate when resolving threshold
authenticity questions.”); Columbia First Bank v. United States, 58 Fed.
Cl. 333 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (finding no requirement in the rule that the
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delays and the lengthiness of disputes endemic to certain kinds
of large cases, it would not be surprising that ESI could have
been prepared more than twenty years earlier for the specific
dispute before the court.59
Second, even if an absence of litigation motive might exist
for a particular ancient document, that would be the only
reliability-based factor supporting admissibility for hearsay
admitted under Rule 803(16). No other hearsay exception relies
solely on the absence of litigation motive in establishing the
reliability required for admission of hearsay. Hearsay
statements are excluded every day even though they are made
without a litigation motive. Take as an example a statement of
an unaffiliated bystander to an accident, made the day after
the accident, indicating that the defendant-driver was at fault.
That statement is inadmissible hearsay even if the declarant is
unavailable at trial. There is no reliability-based justification
for admitting the same statement simply because the event is
twenty years old. The basic position of the hearsay rule and its
other exceptions—that absence of litigation motive is relevant
but not dispositive for determining admissibility of hearsay—
makes eminent sense because many out-of-court statements
are demonstrably unreliable, even if made without litigation
motive. Personal animosities, rampant misperceptions, and
just plain willingness to lie can impair the reliability of an outof-court statement even if the declarant made it with no
upcoming litigation.
Third, the thin reed of (possible) reliability based on
absence of litigation motive might once have been tolerable
because the ancient documents exception was rarely used. But
again, that is likely to change with the advent of ESI. It is
surely the case that lawyers will seek to use the exception more
frequently to admit stored ESI for its truth.60 Establishing
admissibility under 803(16) is likely to be easier than, for
example, using the business records exception to the hearsay
rule.61 That exception, Rule 803(6), requires foundation
testimony or an affidavit from a knowledgeable witness, as well

59

60

61

document must actually antedate the controversy).
See Osprey Ship Management, Inc. v. Jackson County Port Authority,
Civil No. 1:05CV390-HSO-RHW, 2008 WL 282267 (SD. Miss. Jan. 29,
2008) (finding admissible as an ancient document an affidavit prepared
earlier in a lengthy dispute).
G. Michael Fenner, Law Professor Reveals Shocking Truth About Hearsay,
62 UMKC. L. REV. 1, 30 (1993) (predicting that the ancient documents
exception “will be applied more frequently and more frequently it will be
applied to prove essential elements of the case.”).
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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as a showing that the record is one of regularly conducted
activity.62 Other exceptions, such as for excited utterances and
present sense impressions, contain their own detailed
admissibility requirements.63 In contrast, all that needs to be
shown for an ancient document is that it is old enough and
meets the low standards for authenticity (a requirement that
must be met for any document).64 For ESI, age will be simple to
establish because the information will be dated in the
metadata.65 Indeed, the metadata attendant to a file will make
it easier to show that it has not (or has) been suspiciously
altered—thus making the authentication question that is the
basis for the hearsay exception easier to solve than with
hardcopy. In sum, while we once might have been able to
tolerate the fallacy of the ancient documents exception—that
authenticity establishes reliability of content—the prospect of
more frequent use due to the prevalence of ESI requires more
attention to the reliability of old information.
III.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST AN AMENDMENT TO RULE
803(16)

This Article has hopefully made the case that the ancient
documents exception to the hearsay rule is based on the faulty
assumption that the authenticity of a document justifies
admitting all of its contents for their truth—an assumption

62

63

64

65

See, e.g., United States v. Duron-Caldera, 737 F.3d 988 (5th Cir. 2013)
(finding a record inadmissible as a business record because it was not
prepared in the regular course of business activity, but admissible under
Rule 803(16)).
See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (stating that to be admissible as a present sense
impression, the statement must have been made at the time of the event
to be proved, or immediately thereafter, and must describe the event);
FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (stating that to be admissible as an excited utterance,
the statement must have been made by the declarant while under the
influence of a startling event, and it must relate to that event).
See, e.g., United States v. Kalymon, 541 F.3d 624, 633 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“Suspicion does not go to the [factual] content of the document,” when
considering whether the ancient document exception applies, but instead,
“to whether the document is what it purports to be.”); United States v.
Firishchak, 468 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding an ancient document
admissible even though it would not satisfy any reliability-based hearsay
exception).
Metadata is information about data that is not readily apparent on the
screen view of the file. “Metadata includes information about the
document or file that is recorded by the computer to assist in storing and
retrieving the document or file . . . . [Metadata] includes file designation,
create and edit dates, authorship, comments, and edit history.” SHIRA A.
SCHEINDLIN, DANIEL J. CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 380 (2d ed.
2012).
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that is problematically triggered by an arbitrary up-or-down
time period. The Article has argued that the prevalence of ESI
has led to a tipping point where we can no longer allow the
exception to operate the way it has. But all that said, there are
a number of counterarguments to amending Rule 803(16).
A.

How Prevalent and Retrievable Is Old ESI?

The two primary arguments for an amendment to Rule
803(16) are: (1) courts are going to be overrun with unreliable
old ESI; and (2) the necessity of the existing exception is
undermined because facts can be proven by reliable, stored
ESI. Both of these premises assume that there is a significant
amount of ESI that is (or will soon be) over twenty years old
and retrievable for use at trial. But is that assumption valid?
There are many cases in which a party to litigation has moved
for sanctions because their adversary has destroyed ESI.66
Preservation orders and the duty to preserve ESI take up much
of litigators’ time—time that would seem unnecessary if ESI
was not routinely being destroyed (made irretrievable)
pursuant to records management policies of countless
businesses.67 Many organizations delete e-mails automatically
after a certain amount of time unless they are specifically
saved or archived.68 So why should we be worried about an
onslaught of old ESI? And how can we assume that old reliable
ESI will be readily available so that an ancient documents
exception is unnecessary?
In answering these questions, one must first separate out
“lost” ESI from “deleted” ESI. An email is lost, for example, if
the user did not delete it but simply cannot locate it through
search options within her email account. But “lost” information
like this is not destroyed and can be fairly easily retrieved. A
Google search requesting “how to recover old emails” will
produce step-by-step instructions for easy retrieval.69 So the
focus for the question of “how much retrievable ESI is there?” is

66

67

68
69

See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (seeking and obtaining sanctions after employees were instructed to
destroy emails that were relevant to the plaintiff’s claims).
For examples of disputes over records retention policies and preservation
orders, see the materials in Chapter II of SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA & THE
SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65. See also Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (describing document destruction that
amounted to obstruction of justice when retention policy was suspiciously
implemented).
MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 98.
See How to Access Old Emails, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how_5070600
_access-old-emails.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
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most importantly on information that has been deleted
automatically (through a data management program) or by
hand.
Generally speaking, even after ESI is deleted, it is
retrievable before it is overwritten.70 Retrieval becomes more
difficult, however, when ESI is overwritten, or, when a new file
takes the place of the old file on the hard drive.71 Many
operating systems are likely to overwrite deleted data that is
twenty years old.72 However, hundreds of software companies
specialize in restoring deleted and overwritten data, even from
computers that have been severely damaged. For example,
Computer Checkup Premium offers a program specializing in
undelete functions for only $39.95 per year.73 It is, in fact,
questionable whether a standard records management system
wipes its files completely simply by overwriting them.
Certainly, the possibility of wiping a file becomes more and
more unlikely as technology advances. For example, magnetic
force microscopy (MFM) is a recently developed technique that
makes it more difficult to wipe deleted data simply by
overwriting it.74 Thus, there is a solid claim that even deleted

70

71

72

73

74

See MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 120, 205; Why Deleted Files Can Be
Recovered, HETMAN SOFTWARE, http://hetmanrecovery.com/recovery_news
/why-deleted-files-can-be-recovered.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“If you
run a data recovery tool in a timeframe when the file has been deleted but
its disk space not yet used by another file, you will be able to get that file
back. Of course, many things depend on what kind of a tool you’ll be
using.”).
See D Lamberti, How to Perform Hard Drive Recovery After Overwrite,
BRIGHT HUB, http://www.brighthub.com/computing/hardware/articles/9442
0.aspx (last updated Mar. 28, 2011) (“Whenever we store a document in a
PC, and then store another document with the same name and in the
same location of the disk, Windows alerts us, inquiring if we’re certain we
want to overwrite the original document. If we choose Yes here, the
original document is overwritten, and from that point going back to alter
our choice is not possible.”).
See Recover Lost Files and Deleted Emails, PARETO LOGIC, http://www
.paretologic.com/products/datarecovery/pro/index.aspx (last visited Nov. 4,
2014); see also Daniel Feenberg, Can Intelligence Agencies Read
Overwritten Data?, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., http://www.nber.org/sysadmin/overwritten-data-guttman.html (stating that an attempt to retrieve
overwritten data is likely to have an error rate).
SHAREWARE CENTRAL, http://www.sharewarecentral.com/search.html?q=co
mputer+checkup+premium (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
MFM “is a technique for imaging magnetization patterns with high
resolution and minimal sample preparation. The technique is derived
from scanning probe microscopy (SPM) and uses a sharp magnetic tip
attached to a flexible cantilever placed close to the surface to be analyzed,
where it interacts with the stray field emanating from the sample.” Peter
Guttman, Secure Deletion of Data from Magnetic and Solid-State Memory,
USENIX,
http://www.usenix.org/legacy/publications/library/proceedings/
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ESI is reasonably accessible, and that claim gets stronger every
day.75 On the other hand, it is fair to say that there will be
some ESI that will be obtainable only through extraordinary
efforts, such as information on an outdated program on an old
hard-drive.76
In addition to software that can recover overwritten data, it
is now a common practice for data to be backed up in alternate
locations, such as in cloud storage, even if it is deleted from a
particular computer or server.77 Businesses and lawyers have
discovered the importance of backing up old files.78 Computer
forensic experts have found multiple ways to access cloudbased email and other information. For example, with respect

75

76

77

78

sec96/full_papers/gutmann/index.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2003).
Because of developments such as MFM, examination of a disk with an
electron microscope “can still reveal the previous contents of the wiped
area, because the obliterating bytes are not written in exactly the same
tracks as the original data . . . .” Id.
See Clayton L. Barker & Philip W. Goodin, Discovery of Electronically
Stored Information, 64 J. MO. B. 12, 15 (2008). In Lozoya v. Allphase
Landscape Constr. Co., Civil Action No: 12-cv-1048-JLK, 2014 WL 222326
(D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2014), the court found that information on the plaintiff’s
computers could not be considered unavailable until a forensic expert fully
examined the machines. The case suggests a distinct trend toward
recognizing that retrieving old ESI is much less cumbersome or expensive
than it once was.
See Jack Halprin, Sarah M. Montgomery & Hon. David C. Norton,
Preserving and Protecting: How to Handle Electronically Stored
Information, YOUTUBE (Mar. 28, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch
?v=YUQq-03-NUfI (noting that “extraordinary measures” may be
necessary to get data off a very old hard drive).
Use of virtual servers—cloud storage—is a “way to use the storage space
and hardware on a computer or server efficiently to store more than one
operating system or more than one server on the same physical device.”
MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 102. Virtual systems have “become quite
popular as a way to save energy, space, and resources in our everexpanding information universe.” Id.; see also MICHAEL R. ARKFELD,
PROLIFERATION OF “ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION” (ESI) AND
REIMBURSABLE PRIVATE CLOUD COMPUTING COSTS 4 (2011), available at
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20110721073226_large.pdf.
Storage in the cloud results in permanent retention. See The Lifespan of
Storage Media, CRASHPLAN (2012), http://www.code42.com/crashplan
/medialifespan.
Cf. Wells Anderson, How to Protect Electronic Documents—From Yourself,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, June 2003, http://www.americanbar.org
/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_magazine_index
/protect.html (“In addition to a nightly backup routine, consider running a
backup utility that operates continuously or periodically throughout the
day, copying new and changed files to an alternative location such as
another computer's local hard drive.”). The cost for a gigabyte of storage
was $2,000,000 in 1956; in 2009 the cost was less than $1. Jason R. Baron
& Ralph C. Losey, e-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M.
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to email, messages “can be downloaded to a computer in
Outlook, to applications that preserve the email from the cloud”
and thus the emails are “reasonably accessible.”79
Moreover, the very existence of spoliation disputes means
that more and more ESI is now being preserved. The 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s ediscovery rules have imposed duties to retain ESI.80 Preserving
ESI is “important to companies that may ever be in a litigation
or employment dispute, or that have to comply with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, PATRIOT
Act, or other statutory or regulatory requirements. That’s
virtually every public and private company of every size.”81
The significance of the 2006 amendments “becomes even
more striking when one considers that nearly ninety percent of
U.S. corporations become engaged in lawsuits; and that at any
one time, the average $1 billion company in the U.S. faces 147
lawsuits.”82 As such, more and more ESI will be preserved due
to retention obligations.
But even if records retention programs do not prevent the
mass deletion of ESI by organizations, and even assuming that
the ESI cannot be retrieved through reasonable efforts once
deleted, there would remain many reasons to be concerned
about overuse of the ancient documents exception as applied to
ESI. For one thing, much of the ESI that is relevant to
litigation is not generated by organizations with records
management programs. Rather, it is generated by individuals
in the form of personal emails, Tweets, Facebook posts, text
messages, chat room dialog, voice mails, and on and on.83 Much
of this information is unlikely to be deleted by individuals, and
even if it is, the ESI will often be available from others who had
access to the information (such as the recipients of the Tweet,

79

80

81

82
83

Joshua Gilliland, Nitty Gritty Discovery Requests, BOW TIE LAW’S BLOG
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/2014/01/29/nitty-grittydiscovery-requests.
See generally Richard P. Marcus, The 2006 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Discovery of Electronically Stored
Information: Fitting Electronic Discovery into the Overall Discovery Mix,
in SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 1-17.
Linda Volonino, Janice C. Sipior & Burke T. Ward, Managing the Lifecycle
of Electronically Stored Information, 24 INFO SYSTEMS MGMT. 231, 232
(2007).
Id.
Professor Jeffrey Bellin has documented the increased use in litigation of
ESI generated by individuals in their personal lives. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. Rev. 7 (2013); Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook,
Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense Impressions, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 331 (2012).
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or the third-party provider).84 These personal assertions will
often be made without any verification at all—a Facebook post
in the privacy of one’s own home, for example—so there is
reason to be concerned about their reliability. That concern is
not at all alleviated by the fact that the assertion is old.
Second, web postings are preserved for posterity by the
Internet Archive. Indeed, the express goal of the Internet
Archive is to “prevent the Internet . . . and other ‘born-digital’
materials from disappearing into the past.”85 Thus, records
management programs do nothing to alleviate the threat of
overuse of the ancient documents exception as applied to the
overwhelming amount of information that is posted on the
web.86 The same can be said for other types of ESI. For
example, the Google library project estimates that there are
nearly 130 million books,87 and it has so far digitized over 20
million of them, most of which are old and out of print. These
books are now easily accessible, with many more to come.88
That means assertions of fact in those books are automatically
admissible under the ancient documents exception so long as
the books are more than twenty years old.

84

85

86

87

88

See, e.g., Seth P. Berman et al., Web 2.0: What’s Evidence Between
“Friends”?, BOSTON B. J. (2009) (noting that Facebook posts can be
obtained from the computers of any participant in a Facebook
conversation, or “from Facebook itself”); Biz Stone, Tweet Preservation,
TWITTER BLOGS (Apr. 14, 2010) http://blog.twitter.com/2010/04/tweet
.preservation.html (stating that Twitter is now donating “access to the
entire archive of public Tweets to the Library of Congress for preservation
and research”).
About the Internet Archive, THE INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/
about (last visited Nov. 4, 2014).
See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2001)
(“[A]lmost everything on the Internet is being archived . . . . We are
accustomed to information on the web quickly flickering in and out of
existence, presenting the illusion that it is ephemeral. But little on the
Internet disappears or is forgotten, even when we delete or change the
information.”).
Ben Parr, Google: There Are 129,864,880 Books in the Entire World,
MASHABLE, Aug. 5, 2010, http://mashable.com/2010/08/05/number-of-books
-in-the-world.
Claire Cain Miller & Julie Bosman, Siding with Google, Judge Says Book
Search Does Not Infringe Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/business/media/judge-sides-with-goog
le-on-book-scanning-suit.html. In November 2013, Judge Chin, sitting by
designation in the S.D.N.Y, paved the way for Google to continue
digitizing these books despite copyright objections by ruling that the
digitization constituted “fair use” under the copyright laws. Authors
Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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Finally, it is important to remember that the concern about
deletion of ESI in the case law arises in the context of
spoliation claims. That is, a party is complaining that its
opponent deleted ESI that was unfavorable to the opponent’s
position. But that kind of ESI, were it preserved and in fact
unfavorable, would be admissible against the record-keeper
over a hearsay objection as party-opponent statements.89
Consequently, there is a litigation-based incentive to delete it
(if you can get away with it). But the problem posed by ESI
with respect to the ancient documents exception is that the
record-keeper would have an incentive to keep information that
is favorable to its position. It will not matter whether that
information is reliable. Indeed there will be an incentive to
keep self-serving, unreliable accounts as ESI because the cost
of preserving that information will be so low.
In sum, the fact that some or even much of the world’s ESI
is deleted will do little to prevent overuse of the ancient
documents exception as applied to ESI.90
B.

Does the Ancient Documents Exception Even
Apply to ESI?

ESI that is stored for twenty years is not like a magazine
sitting in the attic for twenty years. Electronic data is dynamic.
It is changed, at least in some ways, by the action of accessing
it, viewing it, or moving it. “[N]onapparent information that

89
90

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
One might wonder whether information on digital media might simply
degrade without any attempt to destroy it. Crashplan, an organization
that specializes in managing and protecting customers’ digital data,
created an infographic showing the expected lifespans of various types of
storage mediums. Out of the twenty-five types of storage mediums
analyzed, ten of them are expected to last longer than twenty years under
conditions of regular use. Among the most resilient are the more modern
technologies, such as memory cards and hard drives. However, some
extremely old technologies such as Super 8 Film (created in 1965) and
Vinyl Records (created in the late 1800s) can last for extremely long
periods—seventy years of regular use for Super 8 Films, and one hundred
years for Vinyl Records. Moreover, the number of storage mediums able to
last over twenty years increases significantly if the medium remains
unused or under appropriate care, as is likely to be the case if the medium
is used for archival purposes. Of the twenty-five types of storage mediums
analyzed, twenty of them are expected to last twenty years or longer if
used for archival purposes (and cared for as such). See CRASHPLAN, The
Lifespan of Storage Media (2012), http://www.code42.com/crashplan/
medialifespan. Some Blu-Ray discs purport to be able to last essentially
forever. The M-Disc claims that “once [data] is written [on the disc], your
documents, medical records, photos, videos and data will last up to 1,000
years.” What is M-Disc?, M-DISC, http://www.mdisc.com/what-is-mdisc
(last visited Aug. 6, 2014).
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can become part of the electronic data is called metadata.”91
The dynamic nature of ESI might seem to be an ill fit for an
ancient documents exception if it is thought to be grounded in
the authenticity that comes from a document being in “a place”
where it would “likely be.”92 There would be no worry about the
ancient documents hearsay exception if old ESI could not be
authenticated due to its dynamic nature—because, as stated
above, authenticity is the requirement for satisfying the
hearsay rule under Rule 803(16).
In fact, the dynamic nature of stored ESI will not raise a
substantial bar to the use of the ancient documents hearsay
exception. This is so for a number of reasons. First, Rule
901(b)(8) specifically contemplates that the age of an electronic
document will provide a ground of authenticity for ESI. That
rule covers “data compilation” in any form. If the mere fact that
an electronic document was changed in some immaterial
respect due to storage were enough to disqualify that document
from being found authentic under Rule 901(b)(8), then the
drafters would not have covered data compilations in that rule.
It makes no sense to write a rule of authenticity that covers
information that is per se disqualified from being authenticated
under that rule. True, it is probably fair to state that none of
the original Advisory Committee members were experts on the
technicalities of storage of electronic information. But they
could certainly be expected to know, even then, that electronic
information was not stored in the same way as a magazine or
library book. Thus, the specific inclusion of data compilations
91

92

MATTHEWS, supra note 15, at 17. For a discussion of metadata, see
SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA & THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 356-382.
It should be noted that system metadata—information about an electronic
file that is generated by a computer without human input—is not hearsay
and so would present no concerns for the ancient document exception or
any other exception to the hearsay rule. This is because system metadata
is machine-generated and a machine is not a “declarant” who makes a
“statement” within the meaning of the hearsay rule. United States v.
Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008) (printout from gas chromatograph is
not hearsay); United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir. 2005)
(header information accompanying an image file was not hearsay because
it was automatically generated). On the other hand, application
metadata—including such information as spreadsheet formula or redline
changes in word processing documents—is the result of human input and
so “may constitute hearsay, just as any other ‘statement’ made by a
human being.” THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GROUP ON ELECTRONIC
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
COMMENTARY ON ESI EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY 10 (Kevin F. Brady et al.
eds., 2008). Consequently, the existence of application data in old ESI
further raises the risk of overuse of the ancient documents exception to
the hearsay rule.
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8).
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in Rule 901(b)(8) is a clear indication that the dynamic nature
of ESI storage does not per se disqualify it from authentication
under Rule 901(b)(8), and therefore does not disqualify the
contents from automatic admissibility under Rule 803(16).
Moreover, the best reading of the language of Rule 901(b)(8)
covers old ESI even if it has been accessed, viewed, or so on
over a twenty-year period. This is because if ESI is found on a
server, hard drive, cloud, etc., it really is in a “place” where it
would “likely be.” Nothing in Rule 901(b)(8) requires a
document to have been placed in a hermetically sealed and
immovable container for twenty years; nothing in the Rule
prohibits authenticating a document that has been viewed,
accessed, or moved repeatedly over twenty years, so long as it
is found in a place where it would likely be. So if a frequently
read or moved magazine can be authenticated as an ancient
document, there is every reason to give the same basic
treatment to frequently accessed, viewed or moved ESI.
But even if Rule 901(b)(8) were found inapplicable to
authenticate ESI that had been accessed, viewed, or moved,
that would not deter the admissibility of old ESI under the
ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 803(16)
operates as an exception for a more-than-twenty-year-old
document whenever that document is found authentic on any
ground. It does not require a finding of authenticity under Rule
901(b)(8). Thus, just like new ESI, old ESI can be
authenticated in any number of ways, as indicated by the
scores of cases involving challenges to the authenticity of ESI.93
It must be remembered that the threshold for the court’s
determination of authenticity under Rule 901 is not high: “the
court need not find that the evidence is necessarily what the
proponent claims, but only that there is sufficient evidence that
the jury ultimately might do so.”94 The possibility of alteration
“[is] not and cannot be the basis for excluding ESI as
unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more that it can be
the rationale for excluding paper documents.”95
The following is a non-inclusive list of possibilities for
authenticating old ESI by means other than Rule 901(b)(8):
● ESI of various types can be authenticated by
distinctive
characteristics
and
circumstantial
evidence under Rule 901(b)(4).96

93

94
95
96

For a general discussion about authenticating ESI, see SCHEINDLIN, CAPRA
& THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, supra note 65, at 754-67.
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 (D.D.C. 2006).
Id. at 40.
See, e.g., United States v. Lundy, 676 F.3d 444, 454 (5th Cir. 2012)
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Any public record, including data compilations by a
public office, can be authenticated under Rule
901(b)(7), upon a showing that the record is from
“the office where items of this kind are kept.” There
is no requirement that the records be reliable to be
admissible.97 Thus when an old public record is
authenticated under Rule 901(b)(7), all the
assertions in the record are admissible for their
truth even though they would not be trustworthy
enough to be admissible under the hearsay exception
for public records.98 That is, the ancient documents
exception renders the limits of the public records
exception irrelevant for all of the digital data of the
government that is more than twenty years old.
Under Rule 901(b)(9), ESI can be authenticated
when the proponent provides enough information for
a reasonable person to find that the electronic data
is the product of a system that “produces an accurate
result.”99 Again, “accurate” does not refer to the
reliability of assertions in the document, only that
the output is not substantially changed from the
input.100
Under Rule 902(5), official publications of a public
authority, including website content, are selfauthenticating—no
extrinsic
evidence
of
authenticity is required.101

(finding text messages to be properly authenticated by circumstantial
evidence: specifically, that the defendant, when arrested, was texting and
phoning the victim); Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 39-42 (noting that “@”
symbol and email addresses are distinctive characteristics sufficient for
authentication).
See, e.g., United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“Any question as to the accuracy of the printouts, whether resulting from
incorrect data entry or the operation of the computer program, as with
inaccuracies in any other type of business records, would have affected
only the weight of the printouts, not their admissibility.”) (quoting United
States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988)).
FED. R. EVID. 803(8) (requiring exclusion if the opponent shows that the
source of information or other circumstances indicates a lack of
trustworthiness).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007)
(establishing the reliability of computer read-out of electronic forensic
analysis of defendant’s blood sample for drug and alcohol content by
showing that the machine and functions are reliable, that it was correctly
adjusted or calibrated, and that the data put into the machine was
accurate).
See, e.g., Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689-90 (D. Md. 2008)
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Websites can be authenticated by presenting
information from the “Wayback Machine.”102
● Testimony of a witness with personal knowledge
about the ESI that is presented to the court can
often be sufficient evidence of authenticity.103
● Posts on Facebook, YouTube, and other accountbased social media can be authenticated not only by
distinctive characteristics but also by the
demonstration of use of passwords and email
addresses.104
● Temporary Internet files, even if deleted, can be
authenticated by the forensic expert who retrieved
them.105
In sum, there are myriad ways to authenticate ESI that
certainly apply to ESI more than twenty years old, even if
authentication as an ancient document were not possible under
Rule 901(b)(8).106 Consequently, the risk is real that the
●

102

103

104

105

106

(finding printed copies of state agencies’ websites to be selfauthenticating).
See, e.g., Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C
3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (approving the use
of the Internet Archive’s “wayback machine” to authenticate websites as
they appeared on various dates relevant to the litigation).
FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1); see, e.g., Buzz Off Insect Shield LLC v. S.C.
Johnson, 606 F. Supp. 2d 571, 594 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (authenticating
website where witness testified that he typed a URL, logged onto and
viewed the site, and that the printout offered at trial fairly reflected what
she saw); Adamah v. Tayson, No. 09-CV-5477 (FB), 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis
54172, at *9 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010) (allowing testimony of
participant to an exchange of texts to establish authenticity).
See, e.g., United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding
that trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting against two
defendants Facebook pages and videos hosted on YouTube and
maintained by Google because the Facebook pages were captured as
screenshots and displayed the defendants’ user profiles and postings; the
screenshots included photos and links to the YouTube videos; the
defendants had posted their personal biographical information on the
Facebook pages along with quotations and listings of their interests; each
Facebook page contained a section for postings from other users; and the
prosecution had satisfied its low burden of establishing authenticity under
Rule 901(a) by tracking the Facebook pages and Facebook accounts to
Hassan’s and Yaghi’s email addresses).
United States v. Johnson, No. 04-CR-12-LRR, 206 WL 2548913, at *3-5
(N.D. Iowa Aug. 31, 2006).
This is not to say that all ESI, whether new or old, will automatically be
found authentic. Certain types of ESI present thorny problems of
authentication. For example, database information presents challenges
because it is not just a stand-alone document sitting in a server, but
rather constitutes an amalgamation of separate data elements. Certainly
there will be special problems in establishing authenticity for this
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ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule—simply
equating authenticity with admissibility of hearsay—will
become an open door to admitting unreliable hearsay in vast
amounts of old ESI.
C.

No Existing Problem to Address?

Another possible argument against amending the ancient
documents exception as applied to ESI is that it is not affecting
the courts at this point in time. One searches in vain for a
reported case addressing admissibility of ESI under the ancient
documents exception. While this of course does not mean that
ESI has never been offered under Rule 803(16), it is surely a
rough indication that the problem of using the ancient
documents exception to admit unreliable ESI is not currently
widespread.
As discussed above, the Advisory Committee does not
propose an amendment to the Rules of Evidence unless the
amendment would solve a real problem, so it might be argued
that amending Rule 803(16) due to a projected but not-yetexisting onslaught of old ESI is inappropriate. The
counterargument is that technology and the use of technology
at trials develops very quickly. Trying to keep up with these
changes is very difficult in the context of the deliberate nature
of the rulemaking process. Enacting an amendment to the
national rules of procedure takes a minimum of three years.107
Given all the ESI that will become potentially admissible
without regard to reliability under Rule 803(16) in the next
three or four years, it behooves the rulemakers to get out ahead
of the curve. It would of course not be completely unreasonable
to wait for the problem to rear its head in the courts. The
consequence of waiting is not that the rule would lag behind

107

amalgamated information; and as to ancient documents, there may be
some difficulty in determining whether the amalgamated information is in
a place where it would most likely be. See generally THE SEDONA
CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE DATABASE PRINCIPLES:
ADDRESSING THE PRESERVATION AND PRODUCTION OF DATABASES AND
DATABASE INFORMATION IN CIVIL LITIGATION (David J. Kessler et. al eds.,
2011). Additionally, there may be difficulty in determining the author of
certain ESI if it comes from different sources, such as a dashboard in a
corporate intranet. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON ESI
EVIDENCE & ADMISSIBILITY, supra note 91, at 12. But the instances
demonstrated in text, both under Rule 901(b)(8) and other rules of
authentication, definitely indicate a risk that much ESI will be admissible
for its truth simply because it is pretty easily authenticated.
The rulemaking process and its deliberate pace are described well by
Peter G. McCabe in Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1655, 1671-76 (1995).
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emerging technology, but simply that unreliable hearsay may
well be admitted en masse for a few years. The Republic will
survive. Nonetheless, it is possible to avoid that problem, or at
least to have a change to the ancient documents exception on
the rulemaking radar so that any damage caused by admitting
unreliable hearsay can be limited.
D.

Can the Problem of Unreliable Old ESI Be
Handled By Use of Rule 403?

Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a court may
exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” It might
be argued that amending Rule 803(16) to prevent admission of
unreliable ESI is not necessary because a court presented with
old unreliable ESI can and will exclude it under Rule 403. The
argument would be that unreliable old ESI is not “probative”
and will mislead the jury. But there are at least three reasons
why Rule 403 will not be as effective as the direct approach of
amending Rule 803(16) to close the loophole for unreliable ESI.
The first and most important reason is that when a court
assesses the probative value of a proffered statement, it does
not consider the reliability of that statement. As many courts
have recognized, “Rule 403 is not to be used to exclude
testimony that a trial judge does not find credible.”108 Rather,
“[w]eighing probative value against unfair prejudice under
[Rule 403] means probative value with respect to a material
fact if the evidence is believed, not the degree the court finds it
believable.”109 Take a case in which the defendant is charged
with a “cold case” murder and the government offers a text
message from a drug addict who says he saw the murder on the

108

109

E.g., Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 876 (10th Cir. 2009); see also
Western Indus. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1202 (7th Cir.
1984) (finding that the trial court erred in excluding statements because it
did not believe the witness who made them).
Bowden v. McKenna, 600 F.2d 282, 284 (1st Cir. 1979) (emphasis added);
see also Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1981)
(finding that the district court erred in excluding blood test results under
Rule 403 because it found the test to not be “credible” or “reliable”). In
Ballou, the Fifth Circuit explained that “Rule 403 does not permit
exclusion of evidence because the judge does not find it credible” and that,
when applying Rule 403, district courts should “determine[] the probative
value of the test results if true, and weigh[] that probative value against
the danger of unfair prejudice, leaving to the jury the difficult choice of
whether to credit the evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson,
615 F.2d 329, 333 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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way back from his LSD dealer; or a disgruntled employee who,
having been fired for stealing from his employer, sends a Tweet
falsely stating that the employer is dumping toxic waste. Even
if those electronic communications are patently unreliable
hearsay, they cannot be excluded under Rule 403 because they
are very probative of the facts related if believed. In other
words, once the hearsay is found admissible under a hearsay
exception, the judge cannot exclude it under Rule 403.
Unreliable hearsay has to be excluded under the hearsay rule
or not at all.
It may seem anomalous that such unreliable evidence can,
and indeed must, be admitted insofar as Rule 403 is
concerned,110 but the result is understandable in light of the
different roles played by different evidence rules. With respect
to out-of-court statements offered for their truth, it is the
hearsay rule that screens for reliability, and if the statement
fits the hearsay exception, the Federal Rules are done
regulating its reliability; reliability then becomes a question of
weight for the fact finder.111 The problem with old ESI is that
the ancient documents exception fails in the mission of the
hearsay rule.112

110

111

112

Rule 403 does have a role to play if a statement is offered for a nonhearsay purpose but the jury could misuse it for its truth. That risk of
misuse constitutes prejudicial effect, which must be balanced against the
probative value of the statement as to the not-for-truth purpose. See, e.g.,
United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a statement
accusing the defendant of criminal conduct offered to prove the
“background” of the police investigation should have been excluded
because its probative value in proving “background” was substantially
outweighed by the risk that the jury would use the statement as proof of
the defendant’s criminal conduct, i.e., for its truth). But if the statement is
properly admitted under a hearsay exception, and therefore can be used
as proof of the fact asserted, then Rule 403 may not be used to exclude it
on reliability grounds.
See, e.g., United States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding that a statement that fit the requirements of a hearsay exception
could not be excluded even though the trial judge found it to be
untrustworthy: “False it may well have been but if it fell within [the
exception], as it clearly did if the words of that Rule are read to mean
what they say, its truth or falsity was for the jury to determine.”).
Notably, there are existing cases finding that ancient hardcopy is
admissible even if unreliable, and these cases do not resort to a Rule 403
analysis to exclude the unreliable evidence. See, e.g., George v. Celotex
Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that, if a document is
authenticated as an ancient document, lack of trustworthiness is a matter
of weight and not admissibility, as Rule 803(16) contains no independent
requirement of trustworthiness); Ammons v. Dade City, 594 F. Supp. 1274
(M.D. Fla. 1984) (finding newspaper articles more than twenty years old
admissible for their truth without an independent showing of reliability,
while newspapers less than twenty years old were excluded).
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Second, even if Rule 403 could somehow be used to screen
out unreliable old ESI that would otherwise be admissible
under the ancient documents hearsay exception, the balancing
test of Rule 403 is geared heavily toward admissibility—the
prejudicial effect must substantially outweigh the probative
value for evidence to be excluded. As the courts have said, the
trial court’s power to exclude evidence under Rule 403 must be
invoked “sparingly.”113 Because exclusion is essentially saved
for egregious cases, Rule 403 could not be expected—even if it
were applicable—to be an effective device to exclude all
unreliable old ESI.
Finally, it goes without saying that a Rule 403 balancing is
heavily case-dependent and highly discretionary.114 That caseby-case approach—even assuming Rule 403 could be applied—
is bound to be less effective than a rule that either prohibits old
ESI or at least conditions admissibility on a finding of
necessity. For all these reasons, Rule 403 is not the solution to
the problem of unreliable ESI being admitted for the truth of
its contents under the ancient documents hearsay exception.
E.

Ancient Hardcopy Documents Might Still Be
Necessary in Some Litigation

A final argument in response to amending the ancient
documents hearsay exception is a cautionary one. Even if old
ESI is preserved and accessible, there will still be some cases in
which the only evidence available is old hardcopy. For example,
cases involving immigration violations for fraudulent entry into
the country often must be proven by old hardcopy found in
some archive.115 Courts have also admitted old hardcopy in
asbestos cases, CERCLA cases, property disputes, and stolen
art cases, among others.116

113

114

115

116

Herrington v. Hiller, 883 F.3d 411, 414 (1989); see also Dartez v.
Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[B]ecause Rule 403
permits the exclusion of probative evidence it is an extraordinary remedy
that must be used sparingly.”).
See, e.g., Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 25 F.3d 1325, 1332 (6th Cir.
1994) (noting that Rule 403 rulings are highly discretionary and appellate
courts often affirm Rule 403 decisions “either way” they come out).
See, e.g., United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2004)
(finding that records of Nazi activity during World War II made defendant
ineligible for a visa).
E.g., Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d at 29-30 (finding that a report showing that
a study of asbestos plants was prepared in 1947 was evidence that the
company knew about asbestos risk); In re Paysage Bords de Seine, 991 F.
Supp. 2d 740 (E.D. Va. 2014) (using old museum records in a case about
ownership of a work of art); Tremont LLC v. Halliburton Energy Servs.,
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 2d 741 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (admitting old records
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In none of the above-cited cases was there ESI (let alone
reliable ESI) available to prove what the hardcopies were
offered to prove. Accordingly, one could argue that even if an
amendment were necessary to regulate old ESI, any
amendment should preserve the exception in cases where
necessity can be shown. Put another way, even though the
rationale of the ancient documents exception is questionable
because necessity trumps reliability, that rationale may still be
applicable to certain actions today, despite the development of
ESI. One of the drafting alternatives below provides for a
necessity carve-out.
IV.

DRAFTING ALTERNATIVES

The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee should
amend Rule 803(16) in order to prevent the admission of
terabytes of old and unreliable ESI. In this Part, I will propose
several modifications to the Rule that, if adopted, would reduce
or eliminate the problems described above.
A.

Deletion

One alternative is simply to delete Rule 803(16). As stated
above, the basic problem with the rule is that it confuses the
authenticity of a document with the reliability of its contents.
It simply does not follow that because a document is genuine,
the statements in the document are reliable. One could argue
that necessity alone cannot justify the use of unreliable
evidence and that any hearsay statement that is old and that
should be admissible (because it is reliable) can be offered
under the residual exception to the hearsay rule117—you do not
need an ancient documents exception to admit old but reliable
evidence. Indeed the only case cited by the Advisory Committee
in support of Rule 803(16) was one in which the court found an
old document admissible not because it was an ancient
document, but rather because it carried the circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness that would support admission
today under the residual exception.118
How would deletion be implemented? The rulemaking
formula in such a situation is to delete the text, keep the rule

117

118

indicating disposal of waste in a CERCLA case under Rule 803(16));
Koepp v. Holland, 688 F. Supp. 2d 65 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (admitting old deed
as an ancient document in a property dispute).
FED. R. EVID. 807 (establishing a hearsay exception for statements having
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the hearsay
exceptions contained in Rules 803 and 804).
See FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory committee’s note (citing Dallas County
v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961)).
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number open (so as not to upset electronic searches relying on
existing rule numbers), and provide a committee note
explaining the motivation for the deletion. Thus, the deletion
would look something like this:
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A
statement in a document that is at least 20 years
old and whose authenticity is established.
[Abrogated].
And here is a possible Committee Note for the abrogation:
Committee Note. The ancient documents
exception to the rule against hearsay has been
abrogated. The exception was based on the
premise that the contents of a document are
reliable merely because the document is old.
While it is appropriate to conclude that a
document is genuine when it is old and located in
a place where it would likely be—see Rule
901(b)(8)—it does not follow that the contents of
such a document are truthful.
The ancient documents exception could
once have been thought appropriate out of
necessity due to the unavailability of other proof
for old disputes and because the exception has
been so rarely invoked. However, given the
development and growth in quantity of
electronically stored information, the exception
has become less justifiable and subject to greater
abuse. The need for an ancient document rule
that does not qualify under any other hearsay
exception has been diminished by the fact that
reliable electronic information is likely to be
available and can be used as proof under a
number of hearsay exceptions. Abuse of the
ancient document exception is possible because
unreliable electronic information may be
widespread and would be admissible under the
exception simply because it has been preserved
in a database for twenty years.
One possible problem with abrogation is that it is a radical
remedy in the context of the rulemaking process. No rule of
evidence has been abrogated in the forty-year history of the
Rules. Abrogation of Rule 803(16) is especially problematic
because it would not only be based on changed circumstances,
but would also be a concession that the original Advisory
Committee (and the common law) was wrong in equating
authenticity of a document with the reliability of statements in

36

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

the document. Moreover, the Advisory Committee has been
especially wary about limiting hearsay exceptions and
exemptions. The hearsay exceptions and exemptions have been
amended on only four occasions since 1975. Only one of those
amendments narrowed the coverage of a hearsay exception.119
The others expanded an exception’s or exemption’s coverage.120
Just recently, the Advisory Committee rejected calls to
abrogate the hearsay exceptions for present sense impressions
and excited utterances, the charge being that these exceptions
were ill-conceived from the beginning.121 A total rejection of the
ancient documents exception, even though supportable on the
merits, thus creates some tension with the careful approach—
and respect for the original Advisory Committee—of the
rulemakers.
The remaining proposals consider ways to limit the risk of
overuse of the ancient documents exception especially as
applied to ESI, without the facially drastic remedy of
abrogation.

119

120

121

Rule 804(b)(3) was amended in 2010 to require the prosecution to show
corroborating circumstances indicating trustworthiness before a
declaration against penal interest can be admitted against a criminal
defendant. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 2010
amendment.
Rule 801(d)(2), the hearsay exemption for statements made by agents of a
party-opponent, was amended in 1997 to allow a proponent to establish its
burden of showing agency by offering the hearsay statement itself
together with some independent evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)
advisory committee’s note to 1997 amendment. Rule 803(6), the business
records exception, was amended in 2000 to allow the foundation
requirements to be proved by a certificate rather than by testimony of a
foundation witness. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee’s note to
2000 amendment. Amendments to Rules 803(6)-(8) that took effect on
December 1, 2014 clarify that once the foundational requirements of those
exceptions are met, it is the opponent’s burden to show that the
preparation or other circumstances indicate untrustworthiness. FED. R.
EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments. Finally, an
amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(A), the hearsay exemption for prior
consistent statements, that also took effect December 1, 2014 expands the
exemption to allow any consistent statement to be admitted for its truth if
it is properly admissible to rehabilitate a witness’s credibility. FED. R.
EVID. 801 advisory committee’s note to 2014 amendments.
The suggestion for abrogating these exceptions—Rules 803(1) and (2), was
made by Judge Posner in his concurring opinion in United States v. Boyce,
742 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2014). The Advisory Committee rejected the
proposal because members were not convinced that the exceptions were
without merit and were concerned that the abrogation of two important
exceptions to the hearsay rule would be a radical remedy. See Minutes of
the Meeting, ADVISORY COMM. ON EVIDENCE RULES 5, Mar. 2014 (on file
with author).
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Limit the Exception to Hardcopy Documents

One possible reason for limiting the exception to hardcopy
documents, as discussed above, is that the ancient documents
exception may be thought to continue to play a useful role in
certain kinds of litigation in which critical hardcopy documents
are very old and impossible to qualify under other exceptions.
An amendment with this thought in mind would look as
follows:
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A
statement in a document—but not including
information that is electronically stored—that is
at least 20 years old and whose authenticity is
established.
The major problem with an amendment that carves out
electronic information is that the Federal Rules of Evidence
have a rule that equates electronic evidence with hardcopy.
Rule 101(b)(6), which became effective on December 1, 2011,
provides that “a reference to any kind of written material or
any
other
medium
includes
electronically
stored
information.”122 Rule 101(b)(6) was added as part of the
Restyling Project,123 one of the goals of which was to clarify
that while the original Rules of Evidence were written largely
with hardcopy in mind, the evidentiary concepts established in
the Rules were and remain equally applicable to ESI. Instead
of specifying that equation in every single hardcopy-based rule,
the decision was made to use an all-encompassing definitional
approach.124
Carving out ESI from 803(16) is inconsistent with the basic
approach to ESI so recently taken in the Restyling Project. It is
questionable whether a deviation from a unified approach is
justified simply to allow old—and often unreliable—hardcopy
to be admitted in a handful of CERCLA and deportation cases.
Given the fundamental flaw in the ancient documents
exception, it is probably not worth retaining it in its present
form while limiting it to hardcopy. Moreover, there still could
be a random case in which the only available proof of an old
matter is ESI that is not admissible under other exceptions.
There would seem to be no reason to treat that case differently
from one where the only available proof is hardcopy.
122
123

124

FED. R. EVID. 101(b)(6).
For a description of the Restyling Project and its goals, see Committee
Note to amendment to the 2011 amendment to Rule 101, in DANIEL J.
CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 7 (2014-15 ed. 2014).
See CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, supra note 123, at 10.

38

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

If, however, ESI were to be carved out from the ancient
documents exception, the Committee Note to such an
amendment should explain the conflict between the carve-out
and the general approach to the Evidence Rules in equating
hardcopy and ESI. That Committee Note might look something
like this:
Committee Note. The ancient documents
exception to the rule against hearsay has been
amended to specify that it is not applicable to
information that is electronically stored. The
ancient documents exception remains necessary
for certain kinds of litigation in which
information is located only in hardcopy
documents that have withstood the test of time.
However, the exception is subject to abuse when
applied to electronically stored information. The
need for old electronically stored information
that does not qualify under any other hearsay
exception is diminished by the fact that reliable
electronic information is likely to be preserved
and could be used as proof under a hearsay
exception that guarantees reliability—e.g., Rule
803(6), Rule 807. Abuse is possible because
unreliable electronic information may be
widespread and would be admissible under the
exception simply because it has been preserved
for twenty years.
The amendment provides an exception to
the general definition in Rule 101(b)(6), under
which a reference to any kind of writing includes
electronically stored information. Nothing in the
amendment is intended to undermine any other
use of electronically stored information under
these Rules.
C.

Add a Necessity Requirement

A third option is to apply the ancient documents exception
to both ESI and hardcopy equally, but to limit the exception to
situations in which the initial justification still exists—in other
words, where it is necessary to introduce the old evidence
because there are no reasonably available alternatives. That
amendment might look like this:
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A
statement in a document that is at least 20 years
old if:
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(A) and whose the document’s authenticity is
established; and
(B) the statement is more probative on the
point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain
through reasonable efforts.
The language in new subdivision (B) is taken directly from
the residual exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 807. That
language was intended to limit the use of the residual hearsay
exception to cases where it was truly necessary.125 That same
reasoning should apply to the ancient documents exception: if
other evidence admissible under other reliability-based
exceptions could be obtained through reasonable efforts, then
the ancient documents exception should not be used either for
hardcopy or ESI. Essentially, the proposal ties the exception to
its only real (albeit weak) reason for being.
Adding the “more probative” requirement to Rule 803(16)
would have a substantial ameliorative effect on the potential
abuses raised by ESI. As discussed above, in any case in which
there is old ESI available, there is likely to be reliable ESI that
could be admitted to prove a point. It is otherwise simply bad
practice to allow a proponent to admit unreliable ESI just
because it is old.
The added advantage of tracking the “more probative”
language from the residual exception is that there is case law
that can and should be borrowed from Rule 807 on what
constitutes “reasonable efforts” to obtain information
admissible under other exceptions. The case law under Rule
807 indicates that a proponent must try to find alternative
evidence, but need not undertake Herculean efforts to do so.126
“[L]imitations upon the financial resources available to the
parties and the court are rightfully considered.”127 As one court
put it, whether equally probative evidence is reasonably
available depends upon “the importance of the evidence, the
means at the command of the proponent, and the amount in
controversy.”128 Thus, as applied to ESI and the ancient
documents exception, old ESI might be admissible if

125

126

127
128

See SALTZBURG, MARTIN & CAPRA, supra note 22, § 807.02[5] (explaining
that the rationale for the “more probative” requirement “is that the
residual exception should be reserved for cases of clear necessity”).
See the cases cited in SALTZBURG, MARTIN AND CAPRA, supra note 22, §§
807.17-807.21.
Id. § 807.11.
Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1552 (9th Cir.
1990).
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alternative ESI can only be found by expensive forensic efforts
or could only be read only by obtaining software that is not
easily available.
One might ask: If you are going to add a necessity
requirement from Rule 807, then why not add the reliability
requirement from Rule 807 as well? The answer is that there
would then be another Rule 807—there need not be two of
them. The additional necessity-based language would limit the
exception to its original rationale and it would make it much
less likely that the exception would become a broad avenue of
admissibility for questionably reliable ESI because, in most
cases, there is likely to be reliable ESI that can be admitted
under other exceptions.
Here is a possible Committee Note explaining the addition
of a “more probative” requirement to Rule 803(16):
Committee Note. Rule 803(16) has been
amended to require a specific showing of
necessity before hearsay may be admitted under
the ancient document exception. See Rule 807
(imposing an identical necessity requirement).
Unlike the other hearsay exceptions, Rule
803(16) imposes no requirement that the hearsay
in a document be reliable. The basic justification
for the exception is necessity, but the text of the
existing Rule does not, in fact, require the
proponent to show that there is no other way to
prove the point for which the hearsay is offered.
The absence of a necessity requirement is
particularly troubling given the development and
widespread
use
of
electronically
stored
information. Without a necessity requirement, a
proponent might use the ancient documents
exception to admit unreliable ESI or hardcopy,
even though reliable evidence may be readily
available.
The language added to the Rule is
intentionally chosen so that guidance from case
law under Rule 807 can be used to interpret the
identical language in Rule 803(16).
Of course, the necessity-based solution suffers from the
fundamental flaw from which the ancient documents exception
has always suffered: the unsupportable equation of
authenticity and reliability. Essentially, the exception, as
amended by the necessity language, would say that unreliable
hearsay can be admitted when it is necessary to prove a point.
That is logically problematic, but at least the addition of
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necessity-based language will put the exception back where it
always was—as a backwater in the hearsay rule. It will limit
the damage that will occur from what would otherwise be
wholesale admission of unreliable ESI, and it responds to the
Advisory Committee’s understandable reluctance to abrogate
hearsay exceptions where the ground for the amendment is
that the exception was wrong from the start.
V.

CONCLUSION

The ancient documents exception to the hearsay rule should
be changed before litigants find out that it is an open door to
admitting old and unreliable ESI as evidence. Academic purity
would suggest that the exception should be abrogated because
it did not make sense in the first place. But a compromise
approach—specific language limiting the exception to the
necessity-basis on which it has always been implicitly
grounded—will serve to prevent overuse of the exception as
applied to ESI without the jarring effect of totally eliminating a
traditional exception to the hearsay rule.

